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"-BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
here is - nonetheless applying the principle of the case by extending the duty
of a party to the contract to one who is not a party but a third-party bene-
ficiary; to wit, the duty of not making performance impossible lest the prom-
isor be discharged.
The soundness of such a rule is unquestionable. If the promisor is
amenable to suit on the contract by a third-party beneficiary of that contract,
31
there appears to be no reason for not also extending to him the benefit of a dis-
charge of his obligations under the contract when a third-party beneficiary
renders performance impossible.
Although the dissent did not dispute the rule urged by plaintiff and
adopted by the majority, they did differ with the majority as to the substantive
manner in which it should be presented to the jury for application. They felt
that it was sufficient for the application of the rule if the jury found that the
property owners, as primary beneficiaries, refused consent. The majority,
however, felt it was correct to allow the jury to consider questions of fact as
to whether plaintiff had made reasonable efforts to get consents of the home-
owners, and, if so, whether their refusals made performance impossible, before
applying the rule tendered by plaintiff, i.e., when a third-party beneficiary
refuses to accept the tendered benefits, the promisor is excused from per-
formance.
The position taken by the dissent, therefore, appears to be that plaintiff
had no duty to make reasonable efforts to get the consents of the homeowners,
and, that it is enough to discharge him of his obligations if the homeowners
refused their consent. This position appears comparable to one taken by the
court in Dolan v. Rodgers,32 under a different but well-recognized principle of
contractual law, viz., when, in contracting, two parties contemplate that per-
mission of a third-party is necessary for the fulfillment of a contract, and,
subsequently, that permission is denied, both are discharged on the contract.
The condition is considered an implied part of the contract. It is clear that
the majority did not consider the homeowner's consents as an implied condi-
tion of the contract since they take the position that it was the plaintiff's
obligation to procure these easements. Thus the refusal of the homeowners
did not rilieve plaintiff of his obligation to perform.
ENFoRciBiLiTY OF A LEGAL CONTRACT PERFORUMD IN AN ILLEGAL MANNER
It is a familiar maxim of the common law that no one should be permitted
to profit by his own fraud, or take advantage of his own wrong, or to found
any claim upon his own iniquity.3 3 Consistent with this policy a person who
is a party to an illegal contract, may not ask a court of law to help him carry
out his illegal object. It is thus clear that where a contract sued upon is
31. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
32. 149 N.Y. 489, 44 N.E. 167 (1896).
33. Carr v. Hoy, 2 N.Y.2d 185, 158 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1957); Riggs v. Palmer, 115
N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
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intrinsically illegal,3 4 or where the contract was procured by the commission
of a crime,3 5 recovery may not be had even if the contract is executed.
The weight of authority in this country also denies the recovery on a
contract, valid on its face, where it appears the plaintiff has resorted to gravely
immoral and illegal 6onduct in accomplishing its performance.3 6 However, the
law in New York State did not follow this majority rule. Thus a contract
which was valid on its face, and which the parties contemplated being per-
formed in a legal manner, would not become invalid by the fact that illegal
acts were committed in its performance.
3 7
The Court of Appeals in the recent decision of McConnell v. Common-
wealth Pictures Corp.38 rejects this distinction between contracts valid on their
face but performed by illegal means and contracts invalid on their face and
endorses the majority rule. This case concerned an action by an agent against
his principal for an accounting under a contract calling for compensation to
the agent upon his procurement of a certain motion picture distribution
contract. The Appellate Division affirmed the order of the Special Term strik-
ing out two defenses in the answer3 9 The defenses in question alleged that
the agent, in procuring this distribution contract, bribed a representative of
the producer, contrary to Section 439 of the Penal Law which makes it a crime
to give gratuities without the knowledge of the principal or employer, with an
intent to influence an employee's action. The principal did not disaffirm the
contract and continued to receive the benefits therefrom. The Court of Appeals,
with two judges dissenting, reversed the Appellate Division and held that the
alleged illegality in performing the contract would be a sufficient defense. The
Court recognized that this was a distinct step beyond the old principle in that
they were barring recovery under a contract which in itself was entirely legal.
The holding did not go so far as to deny recovery on a contract in itself legal
but performed in a manner in which minor wrongdoings are committed. The
illegality, in order to deny recovery, must be in the form of commercial bribery
or similar conduct and the illegality must play a dominant or central part in
the plaintiff's whole course of conduct in performance of the contract. In this
34. Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 Nl..2d 571 (1948).
35. Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store, 124 App. Div. 384, 108 N.Y. Supp. 830 (lst
Dep't 1908).
36. 6 VWiiston, Contracts § 1761 (rev. ed. 1948):
Not the illegality of the contract, but the illegality of. the plaintiff's conduct either
in entering into or in performing the contract is the true ground for denying
recovery.
It is true that not every illegal act in performing a contract will vitiate re-
covery. . . . But if the performance actually rendered is something in itself
forbidden by law, the fact that the bargain was in such general terms as to cover
either the illegal performance or a lawful performance will surely not justify
recovery on the bargain if the illegality is serious or more than an incidental
part of the performance.
37. Chesebrough v. Conover, 140 N.Y. 382, 35 N.E. 633 (1893); Dunham v. Hastings
Pavement Co., 56 App. Div. 244, 67 N.Y. Supp. 632 (1st Dep't 1900).
38. 7 N.Y.2d 465, 199 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1960).
39. 7 App. Div. 2d 905, 182 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1st Dep't 1959)..
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case the bribery alleged was found to be of a serious nature and also played
a central role in the performance of the contract.
This rule, as formulated by the Court of Appeals, while supported by
public policy and the majority of other states, is of such a nebulous character
that increased litigation in this area would seem probable. Questions such as
how "serious" or how "illegal" need the acts be to deny recovery on a valid
contract need be answered in each case. Also the question as to when the
illegal act is "direct" or only peripheral need be decided in view of the different
facts of each case. Perhaps the size of the windfall resulting to the defendant
will have some bearing on whether the illegal act is serious or direct enough
to vitiate the contract.
CORPORATIONS
SUITS BY INDIVIDUAL CREDITORS UNDER SECTION 59 OF STOCK CORPORATION
LAW
The principal issue raised in American Broadcasting-Paramount Theater
Inc. v. Frye', was whether under New York Stock Corporation Law Section 592,
a single creditor was a real party in interest and could bring the action in
his own name or whether a class action had to be maintained.
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of the trial court directing
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,3 a creditor of the corporation whose officers
and directors, defendants here, had made loans to one of them in his capacity
as a stockholder in violation of Section 59.
In construing Section 59, the courts have held that the liability is in the
nature of a penalty,4 and that an individual creditor can enforce it in his own
name for his own benefit. 5
The defendants, relying on National Bank of Auburn v. Dillingham,6
1. 8 N.Y.2d 232, 203 N.YS..2d 850 (1960).
2. Liability of directors for loans to stockholders. No loans of moneys shall be
made by any stock corporation, except a moneyed corporation, or by any officer
thereof out of its funds to any stockholder therein, nor shall any such corporation
or officer discount any note or other evidence of debt, or receive the same in pay-
ment of any installment or any part thereof due or to become due on any stock
in such corporation, or receive or discount any note, or other evidence of debt,
to enable any stockholder to withdraw any part of the money paid in by him
on his stock. In case of the violation of any provision of this section, the officers
or directors making such loan, or assenting thereto, or receiving or discounting
such notes or other evidences of debt, shall, jointly and severally, be personally
liable to the extent of such loan and interest, for all the debts of the corporation
contracted before the repayment of the sum loaned, and to the full amount of the
notes or other evidences of debt so received or discounted, with interest from the
time such liability accrued.
3. 9 A.D.2d 735, 193 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1st Dep't 1959).
4. Billings v. Track, 30 Hun 314 (1st Dep't 1883).
5. Wyle v. Gould, 22 Misc. 2d 935, 110 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Walters v.
Spalt, 22 Misc. 2d 937, 80 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
6. 147 N.Y. 603, 42 N.E. 338 (1895).
